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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Survey focuses on the interpretation of, and changes relating
to, various aspects of state energy regulation. Traditional oil and
gas regulation matters are covered elsewhere in the Survey, and
this Article is limited to developments affecting electric and natural-gas
utilities. The majority of the significant judicial and legislative develop-
ments during the Survey period concern the interpretation and imple-
mentation of the statutes and rules relating to the deregulation of the
Texas electric industry.
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A. CHALLENGES TO PUC RULES
1. True-up Rule
The Public Utility Regulatory Act ("PURA") provides that appeals of
the validity of electric competition rules be filed in the Third Court of
Appeals. In Gulf Coast Coalition of Cities v. Public Utility Commission,
ratepayers filed a direct appeal in the Third Court of Appeals challenging
the validity of an amendment to the Public Utility Commission's
("PUC") true-up rule.1 In 2004, the PUC amended its true-up-proceed-
ing rule to remove an express conflict-of-interest provision that defined
who qualified as an independent financial expert in the valuation of gen-
eration assets. As a part of the transition to a competitive electric mar-
ket, the Texas Legislature included in PURA a mechanism for an electric
utility to recover its stranded costs. PURA specifically provides that after
January 10, 2004, each transmission and distribution utility, along with its
affiliated retail electric provider and generation company, must file with
the PUC to finalize any stranded costs it has incurred through a true-up
proceeding. 2 Each affiliated power-generation company must calculate
its stranded costs using one of four specific methods designated in
PURA. One method, the Partial Stock Valuation ("PSV") method, "ap-
plies when an electric utility or its affiliated power generation company
has transferred generation assets to separate affiliated or nonaffiliated
corporations, but only if a certain percentage of the common stock of
each such corporation is spun off and sold to public investors through a
national stock exchange and is traded for one year or more."' 3 The PUC
may either "accept the market value or convene a valuation panel of
three independent financial experts to determine the valuation of com-
mon stock in each transferee corporation."'4 The experts are selected
from proposals submitted in response to a PUC request. In this case, the
PUC sent out a Request for Proposals to the top ten investment banks as
required by PURA. The PUC received no responses to this request. 5
Subsequently, the PUC proposed an amendment to its true-up-pro-
ceeding rule that was designed to draw "a broader group of persons who
would be eligible to serve on the valuation panel."'6 The proposed
amendment deleted the conflict-of-interest provision of the true-up-pro-
ceeding rule, which read:
None of the financial experts chosen for the panel shall have partici-
pated, or be employed by an investment house or brokerage house
1. See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.001(e) (Vernon 2005).
2. 161 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet. h.); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN.
§ 39.262(c) (Vernon 2005).
3. Gulf Coast, 161 S.W.3d at 710.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (quoting 29 Tex. Reg. 5338 (May 28, 2004) (to be codified at 16 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 25.263) (proposed May 13, 2004) (Pub. Util. Comm'n)).
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which has participated, in the business of separation, securitization,
or other activities related to the implementation of PURA Chapter
39 on behalf of the utility for which the market valuation is being
determined.7
The PUC held a public hearing on the proposed amendment, the ratepay-
ers filed written comments and objections to the amendment, and the
PUC summarized and responded to the ratepayers' comments in its final
order. Although it acknowledged the ratepayers' concern that the new
rule did not guarantee the independence of the experts responding to the
PUC's request for panelists, the PUC declined to alter the amendment
and adopted the revised rule.8
The ratepayers first argued that the amended rule was facially invalid
because it did not comply with the PURA requirement that panelists cho-
sen to serve on a PSV panel be independent of the utility. In order to
challenge the facial invalidity of an agency rule, a party must show that
the rule: "(1) contravenes specific statutory language; (2) runs counter to
the general objectives of the statute; or (3) imposes burdens, conditions,
or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the relevant statutory pro-
visions."9 The ratepayers argued that, by removing the conflict-of-inter-
est provision in the true-up proceeding rule, the PUC contravened the
specific statutory mandate that the panelists be independent.10 The court
disagreed, concluding that, unlike other sections of the statute, there was
no express provision in section 39.262(h)(3) of PURA designating the
manner in which the PUC may establish the independence of panel can-
didates. PURA requires only that panelists are independent and leaves
the establishment of their independence within the PUC's discretion.
Thus, both the original inclusion of the express conflict-of-interest provi-
sion and the later deletion of the provision in order to attract a larger
pool of possible panelists were actions within the PUC's discretion.11
The ratepayers' second argument was that the PUC did not substan-
tially comply with the reasoned justification requirement of the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act ("APA"), so the rule is voidable. 12 The PUC's
final order adopting the amended rule must explain how and why it
reached its conclusion in order to satisfy the reasoned justification re-
quirement.13 Specifically, a reasoned justification must include summa-
ries of (1) the comments that the agency received from interested parties;
(2) the factual basis of the rule; and (3) the agency's reasons for disagree-
7. Id. at 711 (quoting 26 Tex. Reg. 10498 (2001), amended in part by 29 Tex. Reg. 5338
(2004) (former 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.262(f)(1)(C)(iv)) (Pub. Util. Comm'n)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 712 (citing State Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 131
S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied)).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 712-13.
12. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.035(a) (Vernon 2000).




ing with a party's written comments.14 The ratepayers contended that the
PUC's final order adopting the amended true-up-proceeding rule did not
include the requisite summary of the factual basis for the rule. They fur-
ther argued that the court's review of the final order should be limited to
the final paragraph. Rejecting their arguments, the court found that the
review of the final order in its entirety showed that the PUC included a
summary of the factual basis for the amended rule in its summary of the
written comments. The factual basis provided by the PUC was that (1) it
attempted to convene a PSV-panel but there were no responses to its
Request for Proposals; and (2) it made a policy decision to consider on a
case-by-case basis the independence of potential panelists rather than us-
ing an express conflict-of-interest prohibition. 15 The court concluded that
the final order contained a satisfactory summary of the factual basis for
the rule. 16
The ratepayers also complained that the final order did not adequately
state the reasons why the PUC disagreed with the submitted comments
on the proposed rule. These comments included the ratepayers' concerns
that (1) the amended rule would not ensure that the PSV panel was inde-
pendent, and (2) removing the conflict-of-interest provision would result
in an increase in the number of qualified persons interested in serving on
the panel. In its final order, the PUC explained that, in order to comply
with the PURA requirement that panelists be independent, it would
"consider appropriate conflict-of-interest standards in selecting persons
to serve on the valuation panel" on a case-by-base basis. 17 The PUC also
stated that the ratepayers' concern that the new rule would not attract a
sufficient number of qualified candidates to serve on the PSV panel was
premature and speculative. The court found that the PUC's explanations
of why it disagreed with the ratepayers' concerns satisfied the reasoned-
justification requirement. It also concluded that additional comments
filed by the ratepayers, such as requesting the PUC to include "appropri-
ate conflict-of-interest standards" in the rule, were not comments on the
proposed rule, but merely comments urging the PUC not to change the
existing rule. 18 Likewise, the court determined that the ratepayers' com-
ments suggesting that the PUC issue requests for panelists to groups be-
yond the top ten nationally recognized investment banks, were not only
beyond the PUC's statutory authority, but were also comments on the
drafting of the PUC's Request for Proposals and not on the proposed
rule. 19
Holding that the amended true-up-proceeding rule was not facially in-
valid and that the PUC's final order contained a sufficient reasoned justi-
14. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.033(a)(1) (Vernon 2005).
15. Gulf Coast, 161 S.W.3d at 714 (citing 29 Tex. Reg. 5338 (May 28, 2004) (to be
codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.263) (proposed May 13, 2004) (Pub. Util. Comm'n)).
16. Id. at 714.
17. Id. at 715 (quoting 29 Tex. Reg. 5338).
18. Id. (quoting 29 Tex. Reg. 5338).
19. Id. at 716.
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fication, the Third Court of Appeals overruled the ratepayers' challenges
and sustained the validity of the amended rule as enacted by the PUC.20
2. Wholesale Market Oversight Rule
In TXU Generation Co. v. Public Utility Commission, electric utilities
and other market participants challenged the validity of the PUC's
Wholesale Market Oversight Rule ("WMO Rule"). This rule applies to
the wholesale electricity market and allows retail electric providers to
purchase power and capacity through bilateral agreements and the bal-
ancing energy services ("BES") market. It specifies the duties of whole-
sale market participants and prohibits certain anticompetitive practices.
However, the WMO Rule "provides a defense to a market participant
who engages in a prohibited activity if the participant demonstrates that
the otherwise prohibited activity served a legitimate business purpose and
that its adverse effects were not foreseeable."'2 1 In addition, the rule pro-
vides that the Electric Reliability Council of Texas ("ERCOT") enforces
operating standards for market participants and sets forth a process for
market participants to elucidate ERCOT protocols to ensure compliance.
The rule also includes a PUC investigation procedure and record-keeping
requirements for both market participants and ERCOT.2 2
The market participants brought a direct appeal challenging the por-
tions of the WMO Rule relating to the duties of market participants and
the prohibition of anticompetitive practices. Under the direct-appeal
provision of PURA, a challenger of an agency rule may only question the
validity of the rule.23 In order to establish that a rule is facially invalid, a
challenger must demonstrate that the rule: (1) breaches specific statutory
language; (2) is contrary to the general objectives of the statute; or "(3)
imposes additional burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess of or in-
consistent with the relevant statutory provisions. '24
The market participants contended that the WMO Rule was void be-
cause the PUC did not have the required statutory authority from the
Texas Legislature to enact the rule.25 Specifically, several market partici-
pants argued that the WMO Rule was invalid because it usurps the legis-
lative authority of ERCOT to regulate the wholesale market. They
contended that the Texas Legislature limited the PUC's role to "oversight
and review" and that the WMO Rule's provisions regulating the conduct
of market participants exceeded this limited authority and contravened
the powers allocated to ERCOT.26 The Third Court of Appeals found
that this argument was based only on a partial reading of PURA. The
20. Id.
21. 165 S.W.3d 821, 829 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. filed).
22. Id. at 828-29.
23. See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.001(f) (Vernon 2005).
24. See TXU Generation, 165 S.W.3d at 830 (citing City of Corpus Christi v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 51 S.W.3d 231, 236 (Tex. 2001)).
25. Id.
26. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.151(d) (Vernon 2005).
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PURA provision designating the PUC's oversight and review role also
states: "An independent organization certified by the commission for a
power region shall establish and enforce procedures consistent with this
title and the commission's rules relating to the reliability of the regional
electric network and accounting for the production and delivery of elec-
tricity among generators and all other market participants. ' 27 Acknowl-
edging that PURA provides overlapping procedures relating to reliability
and accounting, the court held that the plain language of the statute indi-
cates that the PUC has the authority to create rules regulating market
conduct because the independent system operator must have procedures
consistent with those rules. The market participants also argued that the
PUC did not have the necessary "statutory authority to prohibit market
power abuses in the wholesale bilateral contracts market;" however, the
court found that PURA gives the PUC "broad authority to monitor and
remedy market power abuses."'28
A number of market participants claimed that the WMO Rule lacked
an intent element in describing prohibited conduct. They argued that the
PUC lacked the necessary "statutory authority to prohibit conduct that is
not intentional and that the prohibition's inclusion of unintentional con-
duct" contravened the statutory objective to create a rule "favoring com-
petition rather than regulation. '29 The Third Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, finding that the market participants' argument depended
on an erroneous assumption that the only statutory authority for prohib-
iting activities was the section of PURA providing the PUC with the au-
thority to monitor and remedy market-power abuse. 30 Rather, the court
found that the PUC also had the requisite authority under PURA to pro-
tect retail customers and that issues relating to reliability or price in the
wholesale market inevitably would be reflected in the retail market.
Therefore, the court found that the Texas Legislature delegated to the
PUC the power to regulate conduct in the wholesale market for con-
sumer-protection purposes and to ensure reasonably priced power for an-
cillary services. The court also determined that the WMO Rule's
prohibition of unintentional activities is not inconsistent with the statute
because it allows "normal market forces" to set the price of power. 31
The market participants also brought several other claims questioning
whether portions of the WMO Rule were within the PUC's statutory au-
thority. The Third Court of Appeals denied all these claims, including
contentions relating to the burden-of-proof requirements and scope-of-
remedy language included in the WMO Rule. The court also overruled
arguments that the rule impermissibly regulated electric prices by forcing
market participants to charge marginal cost prices and that the PUC
adopted a market-power concept that conflicted with statutory and case
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. TXU Generation, 165 S.W.3d at 832.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 834-35.
1256 [Vol. 59
Energy Regulation
law defining that term. 32
The market participants challenged the WMO Rule on two constitu-
tional bases. The market participants first contended that a number of
definitions and other provisions of the WMO Rule were unconstitution-
ally vague. They were particularly concerned with the rule's general defi-
nition of prohibited activities and its definition of market power, as well
as several other miscellaneous requirements. An agency rule is unconsti-
tutionally vague if it (1) does not give fair notice of prohibited conduct,
and (2) does not contain sufficient guidance for enforcing authorities,
which allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 33 Applying
this standard, the Third Court of Appeals held that the WMO Rule, read
in its entirety and in conjunction with PUC regulations on enforcement,
provided sufficient notice and enforcement guidance and was not uncon-
stitutionally vague.34
Second, the market participants claimed that the WMO rule resulted in
unconstitutional takings without just compensation. They argued that the
preamble to the rule required that capacity be offered at "marginal cost"
under certain conditions.35 Because marginal cost does not include the
entire cost of producing power, the market participants asserted an un-
constitutional taking.36 The Third Court of Appeals dismissed this argu-
ment based on its earlier finding that the WMO Rule does not require
market participants to sell power at marginal cost.3 7
One market participant raised two issues relating to the rulemaking
standards of the APA: (1) the PUC did not provide adequate notice of
the WMO Rule, and (2) the PUC did not substantially comply with the
requirement that it supply a concise statement of the statutory authority
for the rule.38 As to the first issue, the challenger argued that it was not
allowed the opportunity for "meaningful" comment on the PUC defining
a "market power."'39 The Third Court of Appeals disagreed, adding that
the challenger's own comments in the rulemaking record indicated that it
was aware of how it might be affected by the proposed rule. 40
As to the second claim, the challenger argued that the PUC's only
stated purpose for the rule was to ensure reliability of electric power and
that the WMO Rule exceeded the agency's authority to do so.4 ' The
Third Court of Appeals also rejected this argument based on its earlier
holding in the opinion that the purpose of the WMO Rule also includes
32. Id. at 834-38.
33. Id. at 838 (citing Rooms with a View, Inc. v. Private Nat. Mortgage Ass'n, Inc., 7
S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied)).
34. Id. at 844.
35. Id. at 845.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id; TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 2001.024, .029, .033(c) (Vernon 2005).
39. TXU Generation, 167 S.W.3d at 845.




protecting consumers and preventing market-power abuses. 42
3. Quarterly Wholesale Electric Transaction Reports
In City of Garland v. Public Utility Commission, municipal electric util-
ities challenged several provisions of Rule 25.93 of the Texas Administra-
tive Code as it existed before the 2004 amendments, which required
electric utilities to file Quarterly Wholesale Electricity Transaction Re-
ports with the PUC "regarding all wholesale electricity transactions with
a point of delivery or point of receipt in Texas."'43 The appeal concerned
the validity of subsections (g)(3) and (c)(2) of Rule 25.93, which define
and set forth procedures for obtaining "Protected Information." Pro-
tected information is defined as "[i]nformation contained in a [quarterly
report] that comports with the requirements from exception for disclo-
sure under the Texas Public Information Act ("TPIA"). ' '44 Subsection
(g)(3) allows the PUC to release protected information voluntarily and
without a request for information from third parties after the PUC deter-
mines the that information is not protected in a contested-case proceed-
ing. 4 5 The utilities contended that the procedure in Rule 25.93 is invalid
for two reasons: (1) It conflicts with the TPIA because it potentially al-
lows the PUC to voluntarily disclose "public power utility competitive
matter," which is excepted from disclosure under section 552.133(b) of
the Government Code; and (2) it violates the PUC's duty to protect their
"competitively sensitive information" under section 39.155 of the Utilities
Code.4 6
The Third Court of Appeals agreed with the utilities and declared sub-
sections (c)(2) and (g)(3) of Rule 25.93 invalid. The court reasoned that
such provisions would permit the PUC "to determine the validity of a
claim of confidentiality in contravention of the exception to disclosure
added to the TPIA for competitive matters of a public utility and of the
procedure set forth to defeat such a claimed exception. '47 Government
Code section 552.133 grants the governing board of a municipal utility the
power to except information designated as a "competitive matter" from
the TPIA's open-records requirements. 48 The exception to disclosure can
only be defeated if there is a request for disclosure and the attorney gen-
eral or a court determines that (1) the governing board did not exercise
good faith; and (2) "the information is not reasonably related to a com-
42. Id. at 847.
43. 165 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 25.93(d)(1) (2005).
44. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.93(c)(2) (2003) (amended 2004) (Pub. Util. Comm'n,
Econ. Regulation).
45. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.93(g)(3) (2005) (Pub. Util. Comm'n, Econ.
Regulation).
46. City of Garland, 165 S.W.3d at 820; TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.133(b) (Vernon
2005); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN., § 39.155 (Vernon 2005).





The court acknowledged that the PUC "expressly limited its review in
[R~ule 25.93 to a consideration of whether information in the quarterly
reports 'comports with the requirements for exception from disclosure
under the' TPIA." 50 But the court explained that Rule 25.93 "is clearly
calculated to allow the [PUC] to adjudicate for itself the validity of such a
claim of confidentiality" under Government Code section 552.133.51 Re-
lying on legislative intent, the court also explained that the PUC's duty
under section 39.155 of the Utilities Code "to protect 'competitively sen-
sitive' information would require it to protect 'competitive matter' so des-
ignated by a public power utility's governing board under . . . section
552.133. '"52 Accordingly, the court held that PUC decisions under Rule
25.94 regarding section 552.133 confidentiality claims would violate its
duties under section 39.155.S3 The court declined to rule on whether the
procedure promulgated by the PUC in Rule 25.93 lacked statutory
support.54
4. Qualified Facilities
At the Fifth Circuit, Power Resource Group, Inc. ("PRG") challenged
Texas' interpretation and implementation of the Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act ("PURPA"). PRG proposed construction of a natural-
gas-fired generation facility in Lewisville, Texas and began negotiations
to provide power to Texas-New Mexico Power Company ("TNMP"). 55
The proposed facility was certified as a "qualifying facility" ("OF") under
PURPA, and PRG commenced pre-construction activities. On February
13, 1998, PRG made a final written commitment to provide TNMP with
power from the Lewisville QF. PRG considered this commitment a "le-
gally enforceable obligation." TNMP refused to execute an agreement
with PRG and denied the existence of any legally enforceable
obligation. 56
PRG petitioned the PUC to compel TNMP to purchase power from
the Lewisville QF. The PUC dismissed PRG's application on the basis
that Rule 25.242(f)(1)(B) of the Texas Administrative Code did not re-
quire TNMP to purchase power from the Lewisville QF unless the facility
could deliver power within 90 days of notifying TNMP that energy would
be available. 5 7 The PUC determined that a legally enforceable obligation
was not created because the Lewisville QF was not completed and could
49. Id. at 820; see TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.133(c) (Vernon 2005).
50. City of Garland, 165 S.W.3d at 820.
51. Id. at 820-21.
52. Id. at 821.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Power Res. Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 422 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2005).
56. Id. at 233-34.




not produce power for delivery within 90 days.58
PRG first appealed the PUC's decision to the Third Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the PUC's order. PRG then filed a petition for review at
the Texas Supreme Court, but it was denied. PRG next petitioned the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), requesting that the
agency initiate an enforcement action against the PUC for failing to prop-
erly implement PURPA's regulatory scheme. FERC did not act on
PRG's petition within 60 days, prompting PRG to file a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The dis-
trict court held that the PUC fully implemented the regulations promul-
gated by FERC under PURPA and entered summary judgment in favor
of the PUC and intervenor, TNMP. PRG appealed the district court's
rulings (1) that the 90-day rule did not violate PURPA; and (2) that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief for PRG's "as-applied"
claims.59
The issue before the Fifth Circuit was "whether the PUC's rule that a
legally enforceable obligation arises only when a [QF] can deliver power
within 90 days [complies] with PURPA and its associated federal regula-
tions."' 60 PURPA requires the FERC to promulgate regulations to effec-
tuate its "goal of encouraging the development of cogeneration and small
power production facilities."' 61 The FERC, in turn, requires state agen-
cies to implement the FERC regulations. 62
After analyzing the FERC's regulations relating to QFs, the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that PRG failed to show that PURPA and the FERC regula-
tions mandate that all QFs must be able to create a legally enforceable
obligation at any time, including before completion of the QF.6 3 The
Fifth Circuit opined that "states must provide for legally enforceable obli-
gations as distinct from contractual obligations, but 'it is up to the States,
not [FERC], to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power
purchase agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable
obligation is incurred under State law."' 64 The Fifth Circuit held that the
PUC's 90-day rule was within the discretion given to the states under
PURPA and affirmed the district court decision upholding the rule.65
B. OVER-RECOVERED STRANDED COSTS
Cities of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission is an appeal of a
PUC order requiring AEP Texas Central Company ("AEP") to refund
excess mitigation credits to retail electronic providers ("REPs") for over-
recovered stranded costs. On appeal, the district court agreed with the
58. Power Res. Group, 422 F.3d at 234.
59. Id. at 235-36.
60. Id. at 237.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 238.
64. Id. (quoting W. Penn Power Co., 71 F.E.R.C. P61,153, 61,495 (May 8, 1995)).
65. Id. at 240.
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ratepayers and held that PURA requires that over-recovered stranded
costs be paid directly to customers instead of REPs. In this appeal, AEP
raised three issues: (1) whether the PUC had the statutory authority to
order AEP to refund over-recovered stranded costs before the 2004
stranded cost true-up proceeding; (2) whether excess mitigation credits
should be refunded to REPs or directly to customers; and (3) whether the
PUC's decision to not allow AEP to recover interest on any over-re-
funded costs was a violation of PURA. The court found that, although
PURA unquestionably prohibited the over-recovery of stranded costs, a
literal interpretation of the statute did not allow the PUC to implement a
refund of any over-recovered costs until the true-up phase was com-
pleted. 66 In its decision, the court emphasized that the Texas Legislature
only mentions the concept of over-recovered stranded costs in the por-
tion of PURA dealing with the stranded cost true-up proceeding and
does not provide any role for the PUC during the second stranded-cost
mitigation phase except to impose a composition transition charge
("CTC") that allows additional stranded-cost recovery based on the 1998
excess cost over market ("ECOM") estimates.67 The court therefore up-
held AEP's first issue regarding whether the PUC had the authority to
order refunds of over-recovered stranded costs before the 2004 true-up
proceeding, but did not reach the second and third issues relating to pay-
ment directly to customers and interest on overpayment of refunds. 68
Ratepayers also raised issues in the appeal relating to the PUC's deci-
sion to characterize AEP's Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited ("NEIL")
member account balance as generation-related instead of as a transmis-
sion and distribution-related asset.69 NEIL is a mutual insurance com-
pany operated by utilities owning nuclear power plants. It retains
portions of the premiums paid by its members sufficient to cover poten-
tial losses incurred by two nuclear power accidents.70 These retained pre-
miums are known as "member account balances." In AEP's proposed
rates for the 2002 test year, it allocated "the generation portion of its
NEIL premiums to its affiliated power generation company."'71 The rate-
payers claimed that this asset should instead be credited to the REPs.
The PUC issued a decision that the NEIL assets were generation-related,
and the district court affirmed that ruling. Applying the substantial-evi-
dence rule, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed as well. Although there
was conflicting testimony in the record regarding the proper classification
of the NEIL member account balances, the court found that the PUC's
decision was reasoned and that substantial evidence existed in the record
to provide a basis for its decision. 72
66. 188 S.W.3d 681, 670-893 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. filed).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 690-93.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 694.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 696.
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Ratepayers also complained that the PUC should not have authorized
demand charges in excess of those assessed under AEP's bundled rate.
In the initial phase of unbundling, AEP proposed that a demand charge
for large commercial customers be set at $2.83/kW based on a demand
ratchet of 100%. The ratepayers contended that the demand charge
should remain at the bundled rate of $2.74/kW in order to avoid a prob-
lem with headroom. The PUC found that the reduced demand charge
would result in an arbitrary transfer of costs to "high-load-factor custom-
ers" and ultimately set the demand charge at $3.27/kW.73 The ratepayers
appealed the order, arguing that AEP's evidence was not a sufficient ba-
sis for the PUC's decision to set the rate above the bundled rate. Upon
consideration of AEP's expert testimony, the Third Court of Appeals up-
held the PUC's order. The court held that reasonable minds could have
reached the PUC's conclusion based upon the evidence in the record and
that substantial evidence supported the decision to set the demand charge
at a higher rate than that used by the bundled utility.74
C. PRICE-TO-BEAT RULE
Office of Public Utility Counsel v. Public Utility Commission concerned
the process used by the PUC for approving the fuel-factor component of
the "price to beat" ("PTB"). The issue on appeal was whether the ex-
penses sought by two retail electronic providers ("REPs") "were 'reason-
able' estimates of 'eligible' projected fuel expenses, and whether
procedural irregularities tainted the fuel factor determinations. '75 The
PUC approved the disputed expenses and included them in the fuel-fac-
tor component of the PTB.76 On appeal, the district court affirmed the
PUC's order in all respects, except for the approval of the capacity-auc-
tion expense and the allowance for the unaccounted-for energy expense
("UFE").77
As a part of the deregulation of the electric market, REPs in Texas
"were required, beginning January 1, 2002, to sell electricity to residential
and small commercial customers at a discounted rate" known as the
PTB.78 The PTB protects such customers from adverse impacts of com-
petition during the transition to deregulation.79 It "is the base rate of the
utility as modified by a 'fixed fuel factor,' an adjustment accounting for
changes in fuel prices." 80 Further, "the expenses recovered [by a utility]
through the fuel factor are reasonable estimates of the electric utility's
eligible fuel expenses during the period that the fuel factor is expected to
73. Id. at 698.
74. Id. at 699.
75. 185 S.W.3d 555, 561 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. filed).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 560.




be in effect." 8' The intervening parties in the REPs' applications for a
PTB "argued that the expenses [that the utilities] would incur under der-
egulation as a result of competition were ineligible for inclusion in the
fuel factor."8 2 These expenses "included the capacity-auction expense,
[UFE], the transmission-congestion-management expense ("TCM"), the
qualified scheduling entity expense ("QSE"), and the single area/multi-
area management expense. '8 3 The intervening parties also challenged
the utilities' inclusion of coal, natural gas, and purchased-power costs. 84
Based on its review of section 39.202(b) of PURA, the Third Court of
Appeals held that the PUC acted "within its authority to determine that
the capacity-auction, UFE, QSE, TCM, and single area/multi-area dis-
patch expenses were eligible fuel expenses to be used in setting the fuel
factors. '85 In determining such eligibility, the PUC reasoned that, under
the fuel rule, it could not ignore "known and measurable events" that
occur during the year in which the fuel factor is to be in effect. The ap-
pellate court found that such analysis was not arbitrary and capricious.8 6
The Third Court of Appeals further concluded that the PUC's esti-
mates of the amounts of the disputed expenses were supported by sub-
stantial evidence, except for the allowance of UFE requested by one
utility. In that instance, the court reversed the PUC's decision concerning
UFE since the utility did not present evidence as to the proper amount of
UFE allowance. The Third Court of Appeals also held that the PUC's
decisions relating to the requested coal, purchased power, and railcar de-
preciation costs were supported by substantial evidence and that the in-
tervening parties failed to show any harmful procedural error.8 7
D. FUEL-RECONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission is an appeal of a
PUC order in a fuel-reconciliation proceeding conducted under PURA.
Entergy sought approval from the PUC for reimbursement of additional
expenses incurred when it purchased energy from its own River Bend
Nuclear Generating Station ("River Bend") and from purchased-power
contracts. The PUC disallowed approximately $4.2 million of non-fuel
expenses related to energy purchased from River Bend and other im-
puted capacity charges related to energy purchases from external whole-
salers. 88 On appeal, the district court affirmed the PUC's order and
denied Entergy's request for declaratory judgment on similar subse-
quently purchased power contracts. Entergy then filed this appeal. 89
81. Id. at 562.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 562-63.
84. Id. at 563.
85. Id. at 567.
86. Id. at 566.
87. Id. at 579.




In the summer of 1999, Entergy experienced unanticipated power
shortages, and its retail customers suffered rolling blackouts.90 Reacting
to severe criticism and PUC fines, Entergy obtained additional power
from River Bend and some unaffiliated wholesale energy providers under
purchased power contracts in order to provide for the projected needs of
its retail customers. Originally, seventy percent of the energy generated
at the River Bend facility was designated for regulated service ("River
Bend 70%"), while the remaining thirty percent was set aside by Entergy
for sale in the unregulated wholesale market ("River Bend 30%").91 Af-
ter the 1999 blackout, Entergy decided to make the River Bend 30%
available to retail customers for the summer of 2000. FERC approved a
tariff filed by Entergy for the sale of the River Bend 30% ("FERC
tariff"), to be effective June 1, 2000.92
Entergy filed an application at the PUC for a fuel-reconciliation pro-
ceeding, requesting reimbursement of approximately $583 million in ad-
ditional energy expenses for this period. The PUC did not permit
Entergy to recover non-fuel costs related to the River Bend 30% or the
capacity costs embedded in the purchased-power contracts. Entergy ob-
jected, and the PUC referred the matter to the State Office of Adminis-
trative Hearings ("SOAH") for a hearing. The administrative law judge
("AL") found that the purchase of the River Bend 30% was an affiliate
transaction that violated the PUC's cost-of-service rules prohibiting addi-
tional recovery of profit from an affiliate sale. The ALJ also concluded
that there may have been some impermissible embedded capacity costs in
the purchased-power contracts but did not calculate the precise amount
of ineligible costs. 93 The PUC rejected these findings and "remanded the
case to SOAH to determine the portion of Entergy's claimed reimburs-
able expenses that was a profit Entergy realized on the sale of Entergy's
River Bend 30% energy to itself, and to determine the capacity costs re-
flected in the claimed eligible fuel costs."' 94 The ALJ concluded that the
transaction was not an affiliate transaction and that all of the costs were
reimbursable. The PUC again disagreed with the ALJ findings, stating:
"[a]n internal corporate transfer between Entergy's unregulated and reg-
ulated business activities does not amount to a sale."'95 The PUC's posi-
tion was that Entergy should not be allowed to recover both a profit and
ineligible costs associated with the "purchase" of its own wholesale en-
ergy because Entergy merely used its own generation, even though that
energy was designated as unregulated energy.96 The PUC also concluded
that the purchased power included capacity charges embedded in the
contract price. Because capacity charges are ineligible for reimbursement
90. Id. at 204.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 204.
93. Id. at 204-05.





in a fuel-reconciliation proceeding, 97 the PUC disallowed 24% of the con-
tract price-Entergy's estimate of the proper capacity charge.98
Entergy appealed the district court's decision affirming the PUC's final
order on several bases. Entergy first contended that the PUC should
have approved the recovery of the non-fuel costs of the River Bend 30%,
claiming that the filed-rate doctrine required the PUC to allow for full
recovery of all related costs as provided in the FERC tariff and that fed-
eral law preempted the PUC from regulating the River Bend 30% ex-
penses.99 The Third Court of Appeals rejected this federal-preemption
argument. The court found that the evidence in the record showed that
Entergy's efforts to avoid a prohibited affiliate transaction actually re-
sulted in no sale occurring under the FERC tariff. Under the FERC
tariff, Entergy was supposed to sell the River Bend 30% to Entergy Ser-
vices, Inc., which would then sell the energy back to Entergy for use in
supplementing its native load. But Entergy did not execute the sale ac-
cording to this structure-it "sold" the River Bend 30% not to Entergy
Services, Inc., but directly to itself.10° The Third Court of Appeals rea-
soned that, because the sale to Entergy Services, Inc. contemplated under
the FERC tariff never took place, the filed-rate doctrine did not apply,
and the PUC's actions were not preempted by federal law. Because these
sales were not subject to the filed-rate doctrine, the court found that it
was not necessary to address the declaratory-judgment issue.10
Entergy also argued that the PUC's decision not to allow Entergy to
recover imputed capacity charges from energy that it purchased from
outside energy wholesalers violated the fuel rule, which prohibits a utility
from recovering such costs through the fuel factor as part of purchased
power.10 2 Entergy reasoned that, under the fuel rule, the PUC is only
allowed to look at capacity charges that are expressly stated as separate
items in the purchased-power contract. In other words, Entergy argued
that the PUC may not take into account whether there are actually other
capacity charges "embedded" elsewhere in the contract.10 3 Relying on
the plain language of the fuel rule, the Third Court of Appeals found that
the rule does not differentiate between segregated capacity charges and
embedded capacity charges, but refers to total capacity charges. As such,
Entergy contended that the PUC illegally modified the fuel rule without
engaging in the formal APA rule-making process, claiming that the
PUC's subsequent request for comments on a proposed amendment to
the fuel rule, which would allow it to impute capacity charges, was an
admission by the agency that it is required to follow the formal rule-mak-
97. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.236(a)(4) (2004). The proper proceeding to recover
capacity costs is a rate-case proceeding. TEX. U-IL. CODE ANN. § 36.051 (Vernon 2005).
98. Entergy Gulf States, 173 S.W.3d at 205.
99. Id. at 207.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 209.
102. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.236(a)(4) (2004).
103. Entergy Gulf States, 173 S.W.3d at 211.
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ing process in order to modify the fuel rule.1° 4 The Third Court of Ap-
peals found (1) that the proposed modification to the rule was merely to
facilitate the identification and quantification of embedded capacity
charges, not to establish whether the PUC could impute charges; and (2)
that the PUC could consider a matter in a contested case before adopting
a subsequent rule in cases in which the agency did not have sufficient
experience to warrant promulgating a formal rule. 10 5 The Third Court of
Appeals held that there was substantial evidence to support the PUC's
decision to disallow the imputed capacity charges and that it was not an
improper ad hoc amendment to the fuel rule.10 6
E. PUC JURISDICTION OVER CERTAIN MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
In City of Allen v. Public Utility Commission, several Texas cities ap-
pealed the PUC's order invalidating city ordinances. Under the ordi-
nances, Oncor Electric Delivery Company had to place electric
distribution lines underground, screen facilities from public view, and re-
place wooden poles with metal or concrete poles. However, before the
PUC's order, the City of Allen had repealed parts of the ordinances re-
quiring underground lines and replacement of wooden poles. The cities
sought judicial review of the PUC's order in district court, which dis-
missed part of the appeal and affirmed the PUC's order regarding the
non-repealed ordinance requirements. The district court did not address
whether the PUC had appellate jurisdiction over the repealed portions of
the ordinances and dismissed the issue as moot.10 7
On appeal from district court, the cities contested the PUC's appellate
jurisdiction to review Allen's ordinances, arguing that the ordinances
were enacted as an exercise of police power as a home-rule municipality
"to protect the health, safety, and welfare of Allen's citizens," rather than
to regulate the utility.108 Additionally, the cities argued that: (1) an elec-
tric utility's right to construct and operate facilities on city streets and
rights-of-way must be exercised "with the consent of and subject to the
direction of the governing body of the municipality;" 10 9 (2) city ordi-
nances may designate the location of and screening of utility facilities, as
long as they are not unreasonable, arbitrary, or in violation of Texas laws;
and (3) zoning ordinances are presumed valid unless there is a "clear
abuse of municipal discretion." ' 10
The Austin Court of Appeals denied the PUC's motion to dismiss the
appeal, which asserted that the court must first address the district court's
104. Id. at 211-12.
105. Id. at 212 (quoting City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 179, 189 (Tex.
1994)).
106. Id. at 212.
107. 161 S.W.3d 195, 197-99 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet. h.).
108. Id. at 197, 199; see TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
109. TEX. UnL. CODE ANN. § 181.043 (Vernon 2005).
110. Id. at 202-03; see TEX. REV. CIv. STATS. ANN. art. 1175, § 1 (Vernon 2005); see also
TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 181.042-.043 (Vernon 2005).
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refusal to rule on the repealed portions of the ordinances before it could
address the PUC's jurisdiction over them. The court explained that "the
question of jurisdiction is fundamental and can be raised at any time in
the trial of a case or on appeal." '11 But the court agreed with the PUC's
contentions that (1) the ordinances "were an exercise of Allen's original
jurisdiction over Oncor's rates, operations, and services" under PURA
section 33.001; (2) "Allen's regulatory authority cannot exceed that of the
[PUC];" and (3) "Allen may not regulate in a manner different from the
[PUC]" under PURA section 33.004(b). 112
The court of appeals found that Allen's ordinances required installa-
tion of "non-standard electrical distribution facilities" because under-
ground distribution lines, replacement of wooden poles, and screening
facilities are "in excess of those normally required for service" and do not
"minimize the cost of [facility] extension," as required by Oncor's
tariff.113 The court concluded that Allen's ordinances also conflicted with
Oncor's tariff because Allen holds Oncor financially responsible for the
costs of non-standard facilities. Because of this conflict, the court held
that (1) Allen was regulating Oncor's "rates," "operations," and "ser-
vices" as defined by PURA sections 31.002(15) and 11.003(19), and (2)
the PUC had appellate jurisdiction to review the ordinances. 114
The court found that the PUC also had jurisdiction because the ordi-
nances conflicted with PURA's comprehensive regulatory scheme for
utilities. The court relied on (1) the Texas Supreme Court's recognition
of PURA's broad scope in In re Entergy Corp.; (2) the PUC's enumer-
ated power of appellate review of ordinances regulating electric utility
rates under PURA section 32.001(b); and (3) the goal of regulatory uni-
formity.115 The court found additional support in Trophy Club, in which
the PUC concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction over similar munici-
pal ordinances that conflicted with state utility regulations. 116
F. FRANCHISE FEES
In Nucor Steel v. Public Utility Commission, Nucor, an industrial non-
municipal TXU Electric Company customer, appealed a PUC order. The
order concluded that TXU's franchise charges should be (1) allocated us-
ing the "direct" method, which is based on the volume of sales and mea-
sured in kilowatt hours (kWh); and (2) collected from municipal and non-
111. Id. at 199 (citing Pub. Util. Comm'n v. J.M. Huber Corp., 650 S.W.2d 951, 955
(Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
112. Id. at 203; see TEX. UTIL CODE ANN. §§ 33.0011(a), 33.004(b) (Vernon 2005).
113. City of Allen, 161 S.W.3d at 204-05 (quoting Tariff for Retail Delivery Serv. Oncor
Elec. Delivery Co., §§ 6.1.2.2.1, 6.1.2.2.2).
114. Id. at 207-08; see TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 11.003(19), 31.002(15) (Vernon 2005).
115. City of Allen, 161 S.W.3d at 208-09; see In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 323
(Tex. 2004); see also TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 32.001(b) (Vernon 2005).
116. City of Allen, 161 S.W.3d at 210-11; see Application of Texas Utilities Electric
Company to Obtain a CCN for the Trophy Club-Coppell-Euless 138 KV Transmission




municipal customers using the "spread" method. The PUC determined
that the direct/spread methods complied with PURA sections 33.008 and
36.003 and satisfied its goal "'to institute, to the extent possible, a generic
rate design that would honor the principles of cost causation, simplicity,
and equity to customers. ' "' 17 The PUC also found that the methods
honored equity principles because "'the franchise arrangement serves the
entirety of the transmission and distribution system [and] benefits all cus-
tomers in the system.""' 8 Nucor sought judicial review of the PUC's or-
der in district court, which affirmed the order.119
On appeal, Nucor argued unsuccessfully that direct allocation of
franchise charges based on kWh sales conflicts with cost-causation princi-
ples, and instead, TXU should continue to use "'the historical method of
allocating franchise charges on the basis of gross revenues derived by
TXU."" 20 Nucor also contended that the PUC's order allocating the
franchise charges was an abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious,
and in violation of PURA.' 2 '
The Austin Court of Appeals upheld the PUC's order based on sub-
stantial evidence, finding that the rate-design matters were within the
PUC's broad discretion because PURA is silent as to how TXU's
franchise charges should be allocated and collected. 122 The court of ap-
peals focused on expert testimony at the SOAH hearing, which rebutted
Nucor's position and explained the benefits of basing allocation on kWh
sales, including (1) maintenance of an existing rate structure; (2) consis-
tency with metering facilities for transmission and distribution service; (3)
elimination of cost shifting; and (4) fulfillment of the goal of cost-causa-
tion.123 Based on the substantial-evidence rule, the court held that the
record supported the PUC's decision to base TXU's franchise charges on
kWh sales. In addition, by relying on the plain language of PURA sec-
tion 33.008, the court concluded that the statute was silent as to the
proper method of allocation and that TXU's method mirrors the calcula-
tion set forth by the statute. The court emphasized that the PUC has
broad discretion over rate-design matters and that a "'process of discus-
sion, careful consideration, and compromise' occurred in this case. 124
The Austin Court of Appeals also rejected Nucor's argument that the
PUC order permitting the spread-collection method, whereby TXU col-
lects franchise charges from both municipal and non-municipal custom-
ers, constitutes an abuse of discretion and a violation of PURA section
117. 168 S.W.3d 260, 265-66 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet. h.); see TEX. U-nL. CODE
ANN. §§ 33.008, 36.003 (Vernon 2005).
118. Nucor Steel, 168 S.W.3d at 266.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 269.
121. Id. at 263.
122. Id. at 269; see Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 153 S.W.3d 174, 189 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 33.008 (Vernon 2005) (specify-
ing only the method of calculating charges).
123. Nucor Steel, 168 S.W.3d at 269.
124. Id. at 269.
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33.006. Nucor reasoned that the method was inappropriate because mu-
nicipal sales only generate franchise charges, and non-municipal custom-
ers receive no benefit from the purpose served by the charge. Instead,
Nucor proposed a direct-collection method.125
The PUC responded, and the court of appeals agreed, that it was
proper for TXU to use the spread-collection method to recover its
franchise charges because municipal and non-municipal customers alike
benefit from TXU's ability to locate its facilities on municipal property
given the nature of transmission and distribution of electric service. Fur-
ther, since TXU had recovered its franchise charges from all of its cus-
tomers over the past twenty years, the court relied on the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Texas Alarm & Signal Ass'n v. Public Utility Commis-
sion, stating that "when a concept has historically been 'widely accepted
as a proper pattern for rate design' it 'should not be discarded by the
[PUC] without concrete cost data to support such change."1 26 The court
also upheld the PUC's finding that Nucor's proposal for direct collection
would be problematic-rates would vary based on geography, and it
would conflict with the historical precedent of collecting franchise
charges from all of TXU's customers. 127
Finally, the court found no merit in Nucor's contention that the
franchise charge results in "'taxation without representation"' and that
non-municipal customers should not be forced to subsidize municipal
projects. 128 The court concluded that PURA's express language in sec-
tion 33.008 that franchise charges are "operating expenses" evidences a
"clear legislative expression that the nature of the franchise charge is a
fee, not a tax.' 1 29
G. FILED-RATE DOCTRINE
In an appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Texas Commercial Energy ("TCE"), a
REP, sought to recover damages for alleged market manipulation. TCE
obtained electricity for its customers by negotiating bilateral agreements
with electricity generators and by purchasing electricity on the ancillary
Balancing Energy Service ("BES") market. 130 As the court explained,
"the BES market is a bid-based wholesale market for short-term electric-
ity power" that is administered by ERCOT. 31 During early 2003, prices
for electricity on the BES market dramatically increased as a result of
severe winter weather. Consequently, TCE was forced to pay considera-
bly higher prices for the energy it needed, and the resulting financial
125. Id.
126. Id. at 271; see TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 33.006 (Vernon 2005) (quoting Tex. Alarm
& Signal Ass'n v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 603 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. 1980)).
127. Id. at 272.
128. Id. at 269-700.
129. Id. at 270; TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 33.008(c) (Vernon 2005).
130. Tex. Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2005),




losses eventually led to TCE filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 132 TCE
filed suit in federal district court against twenty-four market participants
and ERCOT, alleging violations of the federal Sherman Antitrust Act
and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act ("TFEAA"), fraud, neg-
ligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, defamation, business dispar-
agement, and civil conspiracy.133 The district court dismissed the fraud,
negligent-misrepresentation, and antitrust claims on the basis of the filed-
rate doctrine, as well as some of the breach-of-contract and civil-conspir-
acy claims.1 34 Motions to dismiss the defamation and business-disparage-
ment claims were denied. Because the federal claims were dismissed and
there was no basis for diversity jurisdiction on the remaining state-law
claims, the district court dismissed the entire case. 135
TCE challenged the district court's decision to dismiss the antitrust
claims based on the filed-rate doctrine. The district court determined
that, even if the defendants participated in improper market manipula-
tion, the filed-rate doctrine precluded recovery on the antitrust claims.
Under the filed-rate doctrine, allegations that a regulated entity's filed
rates are too high, unfair, or unlawful is precluded because the filed rate
has been approved by the governing regulatory agency and is thus consid-
ered per se reasonable. 136 TCE argued that the district court erred in
applying the filed-rate doctrine because (1) the Texas Legislature in-
tended for parties to bring private claims under PURA; (2) wholesale
energy rates in the BES market are not filed with the PUC and are there-
fore not subject to the filed-rate doctrine; (3) antitrust exemptions should
be narrowly construed; and (4) PURA does not create a substitute-dam-
ages mechanism. 137
TCE asserted that the Texas Legislature intended to allow private anti-
trust claims to be brought under PURA, citing the savings clause in
PURA that expressly states, "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
to confer immunity from state or federal antitrust laws."1 38 TCE argued
that, by applying the filed-rate doctrine, the district court conferred im-
munity on the defendants and thus violated this provision of PURA. The
Fifth Circuit disagreed with TCE's position, stating that the Supreme
Court had explicitly rejected this position. 13 9 Regulated entities that "en-
gage in anticompetitive activities based on filed rates are still subject to
scrutiny under the antitrust laws by the Government and to possible crim-
132. Id. at 506-07.
133. Id. at 507.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 507-08.
136. Id.; see generally Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S.
409, 422 (1986); Keogh v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922); Wegoland, Ltd. v.
NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1994).
137. Tex. Commercial Energy, 413 F.3d at 508.
138. Id. (quoting TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.158(b) (Vernon 2005)): "This chapter is
intended to complement other state and federal antitrust provisions. Therefore, antitrust
remedies may also be sought in state or federal court to remedy anticompetitive
activities.").
139. Id. (citing Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 422).
1270 [Vol. 59
Energy Regulation
inal sanctions or equitable relief. '140 The Fifth Circuit determined that
the filed-rate doctrine applied with equal force to both the federal and
state antitrust claims, and the application of this defense gave effect to
the Texas Legislature's intent to have PURA complement federal and
state antitrust statutes.141
TCE also took the position that the filed-rate doctrine was improperly
applied because PURA does not require rates in the BES market to be
filed with and approved by the PUC. The court disagreed. After review-
ing similar decisions made by other circuits, 142 the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the market-oversight responsibility given to the PUC in PURA to
"ensure 'safe, reliable, and reasonably priced electricity," as well as the
PUC requirements that electricity generators file market-power informa-
tion and market-power-mitigation plans, were sufficient to determine that
the BES rates were "filed" within the meaning of the filed-rate
doctrine.1 43
TCE further contended that its antitrust claims were exempt from the
filed-rate doctrine under the "competitor exception. ' 144 The competitor
exception provides "that 'an anticompetitive practice embodied in a
[filed] tariff may [still] violate the antitrust laws if it . . . impacts upon
competitors as opposed to customers."' 145 This exception has never been
recognized by either the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court. The Fifth
Circuit concluded that, "[a]ssuming, without deciding, that such an excep-
tion exists," TCE was not a competitor of the defendants in this case. 146
TCE is a REP, and its claims of market manipulation are based on the
defendants' actions as electric-generation companies. The Fifth Circuit
held that the district court did not err in refusing to apply the competitor
exception. 147
Finally, TCE argued that the filed-rate doctrine is inapplicable because
PURA did not create a "substitute mechanism for the recovery of dam-
ages."' 148 The Fifth Circuit held that TCE waived this argument on ap-
peal because TCE failed to raise it before the district court. The Fifth
Circuit therefore affirmed the district-court judgment dismissing TCE's
state and federal antitrust claims.1 49
AEP Texas North Co. v. Hudson involved an appeal of a PUC order in
a fuel-reconciliation proceeding. In AEP Texas' application to the PUC
140. Id. (quoting Square D. Co., 476 U.S. at 422).
141. Id. at 509.
142. See Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 409 (1st Cir. 2000);
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756, 760
(9th Cir. 2004).
143. Tex. Commercial Energy, 413 F.3d at 509-10 (quoting TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN.
§ 39.101(a)(1) (Vernon 2005)).
144. Id. at 510.








to reconcile its fuel costs from July 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001,
an issue arose over the amount of revenue the utility was required to
share with its customers under two agreements: (1) the System Integra-
tion Agreement ("SIA"), a wholesale-rate schedule filed at FERC, and
(2) the Integrated Stipulation and Agreement relating to the merger of
AEP Texas' parent company, American Electric Power Company
("AEPC"), and another public-utility holding company.150 The SIA pro-
vided that the Trading and Market Realizations ("TMRs"), profits from
off-system sales and purchase of power, would be allocated between the
AEP east and west zones, which correspond to the pre-merger systems of
the two companies. The SIA also specified how AEP Texas was to share
its revenue with its retail customers once a designated agent, American
Electric Power Service Corporation ("AEPSC"), had allocated the reve-
nue between the two zones. 151 AEPSC calculated the TMRs using
"'mark to market' accounting in which the 'open' transactions, transac-
tions that had yet to be completed, were recorded at market value, while
'closed' or completed transactions were recorded at the actual contract
value."' 152 The PUC disagreed with the AEPSC's inclusion of both the
open and closed transactions in the "Base Year" allocation and ordered
AEP Texas to recalculate the TMR allocation without including the open
transactions. The PUC's allocation methodology resulted in higher
TMRs and equivalent revenue for the AEP Texas zone. 153
Alleging violations of the Federal Power Act and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, AEP Texas filed suit in federal
court, challenging the portion of the PUC's order that required AEP
Texas to reallocate the TMRs. The utility argued that the PUC was fed-
erally preempted from reviewing AEPSC's allocation of the TMRs and
that the PUC had to accept the AEPSC's methodology as approved by
the FERC. The agency, on the other hand, contended that its interpreta-
tion and application of the terms of the SIA was proper and that its rejec-
tion of the AEPSC allocation was justified. Under the Federal Power
Act, the FERC is granted exclusive jurisdiction to regulate wholesale
electric transmissions and sales in interstate commerce, and utilities are
required to file tariffs with FERC showing their rates and charges for
such transmissions and sales.154 Further, in an opinion concerning the
filed-rate doctrine, the United States Supreme Court held that the FERC
has exclusive jurisdiction over transactions among affiliated utilities oper-
ating an interstate power pool.1 55 After evaluating these legal principles,
the court found that the SIA is a federally approved tariff and that the
PUC did not have jurisdiction to review and reject the AESPC's alloca-
tion of TMRs. The PUC was obligated to accept the AESPC allocation
150. 389 F. Supp. 2d 759, 761 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 762.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 763-64; 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824d(c) (2005).
155. Id. at 765; Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39, 49 (2003).
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so long as it was approved by the FERC. The court noted that if the PUC
felt that the AESPC's allocation of TMRs was improper, it had a remedy
under the Federal Power Act allowing the PUC to seek a determination
from the FERC that the SIA had been violated.
1 5 6
III. GAS UTILITY REGULATION
In Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read, the gas utility commenced eight
condemnation proceedings in Leon County, which were distributed to
three different judicial district courts serving the county. Although the
district clerk assigned the case to Judge Sandel of the 278th Judicial Dis-
trict, Judge Bournias of the 87th Judicial District appointed special com-
missioners in all eight proceedings. In the case at hand, which involved
an easement for a gas pipeline over the Reads' property, the commission-
ers found that the Reads were entitled to an award for the easement, and
Judge Bournias granted the gas utility a writ of possession.157 After filing
an objection to the commissioners' award, the gas utility filed a motion
for partial summary judgment with Judge Sandel. Judge Sandel dismissed
the proceeding, and a jury awarded damages to the Reads. The gas utility
then brought a second condemnation proceeding to establish its right to
the easement over the Reads' property. 158
The gas utility also appealed Judge Sandel's judgment on the Reads'
claims for damages in the first condemnation proceeding. The court of
appeals concluded that the second proceeding rendered the case moot
and dismissed the appeal. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the case, holding that the gas utility had an interest in the out-
come of the case because damages were at issue. On remand, the court of
appeals upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that Judge Bournias
lacked jurisdiction to appoint special commissioners because there was no
agreement to exchange benches with Judge Sandel.' 59
In its opinion, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals and held that both Judge Sandel and Judge Bournias had
concurrent jurisdiction over the case because the 278th and 87th Judicial
Districts both include Leon County. The court disagreed with the Reads'
view that a proper exchange of benches was necessary to establish Judge
Bournias' jurisdiction over the case. The court relied on the Texas Con-
stitution, explaining that (1) "[n]o formal order is needed for an exchange
or transfer to take place," and (2) "the right of district judges to exchange
benches assumes that they already have concurrent jurisdiction over the
same cases in a common county. ' 160
The court also emphasized section 21.013 of the Property Code, which
governs district and county clerks' assignment of eminent-domain cases
156. AEP Tex., 389 F. Supp. 2d at 765; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(e), 824e(a), 825e.
157. 160 S.W.3d 564, 565 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam).
158. Id. at 565-66.




"'to each court with jurisdiction that the clerk serves."1 61 The court con-
tinued "[t]he statute does not purport to confer exclusive jurisdiction
upon the court to which a case is assigned," and recognizes that multiple
courts can have jurisdiction.1 62 Moreover, the court explained that sec-
tion 21.014 of the Property Code, which requires a judge presiding over
an eminent-domain case to appoint special commissioners, does not "sug-
gest[ ] that it confers exclusive jurisdiction to appoint commissioners to
the judge to which an eminent domain case is assigned."'1 63
The Texas Supreme Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court
of appeals and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the Reads for
their wrongful-entry action. The court remanded the condemnation pro-
ceeding to the trial court to resolve condemnation damages in the original
and second condemnation proceedings. 164
IV. LEGISLATION
A. ELECTRIC
1. House Bill 989: Recovery of certain electric utility transmission
investments165
This legislation amends Chapter 36 of the Utilities Code by allowing an
electric utility operated outside of ERCOT to recover transmission infra-
structure-improvement costs through a rate rider mechanism without a
rate proceeding. The rate-rider mechanism is limited in applicability to
non-ERCOT utilities in areas included in the Southwest Power Pool or
the Western Electricity Coordinating Council that own or operate trans-
mission facilities. The bill also authorizes the PUC to allow an electric
utility to annually recover its reasonable and necessary expenditures for
transmission infrastructure-improvement costs and changes in wholesale
transmission to the electric utility under a tariff approved by a federal
regulatory authority to the extent that the costs have not already been
recovered. The legislature stipulated that the utility may recover only
costs allowable to customers in the State of Texas and may not over-re-
cover costs. 166
2. House Bill 1567: Delay in the deregulation of certain utilities outside
of ERCOT167
House Bill 1567 amends Chapter 39 of the Utilities Code, which relates
to the transition to electric deregulation in certain non-ERCOT areas.
The legislature provided that the rates of an investor-owned electric util-
ity that was operating as of January 1, 2005, solely outside of ERCOT in
161. Id. (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.013(d) (Vernon 2005)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 567; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.014 (Vernon 2005).
164. Pinnacle Gas, 160 S.W.3d at 567-68.
165. Tex. H.B. 989, 79th Leg., R.S., 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1024.
166. Id.
167. Tex. H.B. 1567, 79th Leg., R.S., 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1072.
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areas of Texas included in the Southeastern Electric Liability Council,
will continue to be regulated under the traditional cost-of-service regula-
tion, that the utility may file for rate changes and/or approval of rate-
rider mechanisms, and that the utility is subject to all applicable regula-
tory authority.168
The bill prohibits the utility from filing a rate proceeding or altering or
revoking an offered rate charged by the utility before June 30, 2007. The
rate change is to go into effect no earlier than June 30, 2008. The legisla-
tion requires the utility to establish two vertically-integrated utilities-
one under the jurisdiction of the PUC and the other under the jurisdic-
tion of the Louisiana Public Service Commission. The utility is also re-
quired to file a plan with the PUC by January 1, 2006, identifying the
applicable power regions that they may enter to develop competition. 169
A utility is also required to file a transition-to-competition plan with
the PUC by the earlier of either January 1, 2007, or the ninetieth day after
the applicable power region is certified, identifying how the utility intends
to mitigate market power, achieve full customer choice, and achieve any
other measure that is consistent with the public interest. The plan must
include a provision to reinstate a customer-choice pilot project and a
price to beat for residential and commercial customers having a peak load
of 1000 kilowatts or less. 170
3. Senate Bill 408: Public Utility Commission sunset legislation1 71
This legislation extends the PUC to September 1, 2011 and modifies a
number of the agency's administrative procedures. First, the Utilities
Code was amended to require the PUC to develop and implement negoti-
ated rulemaking and alternative dispute-resolution procedures. Second,
the bill increases the administrative penalty for violations of PURA or
PUC rules from $5,000 to $25,000 and requires the PUC to establish a
classification system for violations that includes a range of administrative
penalties that may be assessed based on various factors, such as the seri-
ousness of the violation. Third, section 39.151 of the Utilities Code was
amended to specify that the PUC, rather than an "independent organiza-
tion," establish and enforce procedures relating to the reliability of the
regional electric network and the accounting for the production and de-
livery of electricity among generators and other market participants. The
legislation also redefines an "independent organization" and outlines its
structure, duties, membership qualifications, and pubic-meeting require-
ments. The independent organization is required to contract with and
support a PUC-selected entity to act as the agency's wholesale electric-
market monitor, which is required to immediately report to the PUC




171. Tex. S.B. 408, 79th Leg., R.S., 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 797.
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lations of [PUC] rules or rules of the independent organization.' 72
4. Senate Bill 712: Energy efficiency goals and programs173
The legislature included, as part of its energy-efficiency goals, the op-
portunity for each customer to reduce its peak demand for energy. The
legislation requires each electric utility to provide System Benefit Fund
funding for certain low-income energy-efficiency programs in an amount
equal to or greater than funding for those programs in 2003 fiscal year. It
also extends indefinitely the deadline for achievement of legislative en-
ergy-efficiency goals. 174
5. Senate Bill 1668: Affiliate burden of proof relative to charges for
capital costs175
This legislation provides that, in considering the reasonableness of an
electric utility's payment to an affiliate for capital costs, the regulatory
authority must find that the price to the electric utility is not higher than
the prices that the supplying affiliate charge for the same item to its other
affiliates or to a non-affiliated person within the same market area or
having the same market conditions.176 Upon a finding of unreasonable-
ness, the regulatory authority is required to "determine the reasonable
level of the expense, and include that expense in determining the utility's
cost of service. '177
B. GAS UTILITY
1. House Bill 474: Reporting requirements for gas utilities1 78
Amending Texas Utilities Code section 102.051(a), this legislation re-
quires a gas utility to report to the Railroad Commission "(1) a sale, ac-
quisition, or lease of a plant as an operating unit or system in this state for
a total consideration of more than $1 million; or (2) a merger or consoli-
dation with another gas utility operating in this state.' 79 The legislature
changed the requirement that gas utilities report such a transaction
"within a reasonable time" to within sixty days following the effective
date of the transaction. 180
172. Id.
173. Tex. S.B. 712, 79th Leg., R.S., 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 328.
174. Id.
175. Tex. S.B. 1668, 79th Leg., R.S., 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 413.
176. Id.
177. Id.





2. House Bill 872: Pipeline safety, annual inspection fee, and
suspension of interim rate implementation81
This legislation amends sections 121.211(d), 12 1.211(g), and 104.301(a)
of the Texas Utilities Code. It clarifies that the Railroad Commission is
to collect from operators of natural-gas-distribution systems an annual
inspection fee of up to fifty cents for each service line. The bill also pro-
vides that an interim tariff or rate-schedule adjustment to recover the cost
of changes in the investment in gas-utilities service, filed by a gas utility
with a regulatory authority at least sixty days before implementing the
interim rate, may be suspended by the regulatory authority for up to
forty-five days. The previous law allowed an indefinite suspension of the
interim rate implementation.1 82
V. CONCLUSION
The cases and legislation included in this Survey should provide attor-
neys with a guide to significant developments in Texas law concerning
electric and natural-gas utilities. As most of the cases demonstrate, Texas
courts are continuing to interpret and implement the statutes and regula-
tions that facilitate the transition from a regulated electric market to a
competitive Texas electric industry.
181. Tex. H.B. 872, 79th Leg., R.S., 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 948.
182. Id.
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